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Till Stellmacher 
 
The historical development of local forest governance in 
Ethiopia – from imperial times to the military regime of 
the Derg1 
 
 
orest governance is a critical crosscutting issue for communities living in 
and from forests. The need to address forest governance in this work 
stems from the fact that forest governance not only impacts forest users’ live-
lihoods but also the forest ecosystem. Whether forest land and resources are 
the property of the state, of an individual, of a group of individuals, or of a 
combination of these stakeholders, and whether governance is actually exe-
cuted, are relevant concerns in this regard. The main tools of governance are 
institutions, here understood as the ‘rules of the game’ (North 1990, Ostrom 
et al. 1994). Their enforcement means putting these rules to work. Institutions 
are highly path dependent. Accordingly, the roots of the present forest gov-
ernance system are likely to be found in earlier systems and institutions. 
However, not only in south-western Ethiopia but also across the country, 
primary forests have been dwindling rapidly for a long time. During the past 
100 years, the forests in Ethiopia have shrunk from approximately forty per 
cent of the country’s total area to less than three per cent (Gebre and Deribe 
2001 in Richerzhagen and Virchow 2002: 10). The most apparent reasons are 
the destructive activities of the local population, undergrowth clearing for in-
tensification and expansion of agriculture and extensive cutting of timber 
and wood for construction and fuel among others. It appears that this is 
mainly caused by population growth and poverty, since poor households 
have short time horizons and cannot afford to put much effort, time, or 
money towards sustainable long-term utilisation practices (Regasa 2000: 140). 
However, these explanations address just one part of the story. From the 
1980s onwards, an increasing number of scholars and practitioners have 
come to the conclusion that a lack of appropriate and enforced formal or in-
formal institutions that determine who enjoys which use and access rights to 
                                            
1  This paper has been written within the framework of the research project ‘Conservation 
and use of wild populations of Coffea Arabica in the mountainous moist forests of Ethiopia’ 
carried out by the ‘Center for Development Research’ (ZEF) in Bonn, Germany in collabora-
tion with the ‘Institute for Biodiversity Conservation’ (IBC) in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 
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particular forest resources can be another underlying cause of forest deple-
tion and loss (Agrawal 1995). This leads us to the definitional question of 
what is understood with the notion formal and informal institution in refer-
ence to the concrete subject of this paper. 
 
 
Critical discussion on the apparent dualism  
Between formal and informal institutions 
 
The attribute of institutions which is most commonly highlighted in the lit-
erature is their degree of formality. Different institutional theories including 
Douglas North’s new institutional economics approach classify institutions 
according to formality, which has led to the dichotomous itemisation of 
‘formal’ and ‘informal’. According to this understanding, formal institutions 
are defined as 
 
The law sphere, […] constitutions and regulations, [the reinforcement of 
which] is guaranteed by the legal system (Tridico 2004: 6). 
 
Hence, formal institutions are directly linked to political and economic struc-
tures such as governance, property rights, and the judiciary system. Informal 
institutions are defined as 
 
Arrangements or rules of behaviour such as sanctions, customs, traditions, 
and codes of conduct (North 1991 in Marsh 2003: 3). 
 
Pejovich (1999) and Tridico (2004: 5) draw attention to the evolution of in-
formal institutions by defining them as ‘carriers of history’ which have 
‘passed the test of the historical time’. Other authors understand informal in-
stitutions to be extensions, elaborations, or modifications of formal ones, and 
hence disparage them as mere appurtenances (Elnaiem 2004: 5). In the con-
text of natural resource use, older literature neglected and underestimated 
the substance of informal institutions (Hardin 1968), even characterising 
them as chaotic and conductive to environmental degradation. In contrast, 
much contemporary literature applauds informal institutions, particularly 
the body of indigenous rights and regulations, highlighting their robustness, 
their ability to adapt to precarious and changing microenvironments, their 
risk aversion, their historical rootedness within societies, and their potential 
to regulate natural resource use (Watson 2001: 6). Nevertheless, both extreme 
standpoints merit qualified critique. 
The degree of formality of an institution does not earmark it as good or 
bad per se. Sticking to the research subject, reality has shown that neither 
formal nor informal institutions can by themselves prevent the depletion and 
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destruction of forest resources, and that their interlinkage, hence the appro-
priate ‘mix’ of institutions of different formality, is the key factor determin-
ing whether institutions are ‘successful’ or not. 
This paper analyses natural resource governance in traditional societies 
in rural Ethiopia, in which the occurrence, differentiation, and  connection of 
formal and informal institutions are utterly unlike those in the urban-
dominated social reality in what are labelled ‘modern’ Western societies. In 
rural traditional societies, generally speaking, informal institutions play a 
much greater role in human behaviour, whereas formal institutions are much 
less developed, potent, and historically embedded. Therefore, it is vital to be 
conscious that informal institutions are not substitutes for formal ones, re-
sulting simply from the fact that traditional societies are un- or ill-served by 
lacking or limited formal institutions, as argued by Jütting (2003: 11) and 
Marsh (2003: 31). Rather, informal institutions are in many cases the defini-
tive and primary institutions. They might even have been formal in the past, 
but now be amended or suppressed due to the more recent creation of formal 
ones. Another equivocal postulation on the interrelation of formal and in-
formal institutions is that once adequate formal institutions are built up, in-
formal ones will meet their terms. This assumption is applicable in certain 
circumstances of ‘modern’ Western societies, but does not correspond with 
the reality in traditional African societies (Dia 1996, Ogo Ujomu n.d.). 
The differentiation between formal and informal institutions depends 
greatly on the standpoint. From the perspective of Ethiopian forest-resource 
users, formal institutions might be equated with coming from ‘outside’, 
whether or not they fulfil formal criteria. Conversely, institutions which are 
labelled informal and traditionally derived from within the community 
might have a high degree of formality, for example, written by-laws. 
In conclusion, the criticism that the formal and informal dichotomy is 
derived from ‘Western’ historical experiences and points of view, and in 
some cases adheres to the notion that traditional  informal institutions are 
subordinate to ‘modern’ and steady formal ones, is justified. Therefore, the 
level of formality does not provide an appropriate means of distinguishing 
institutions in traditional rural societies. Consequently, this classification is 
not helpful when discussing the institutional landscape in rural Africa at 
large, and the historical development of local forest governance in Ethiopia 
in particular. 
 
 
The case study area: Kaffa Zone, south-western Ethiopia 
 
Kaffa Zone is located in south-western Ethiopia. It is an administrative unit 
of the Southern Nations and Nationalities Peoples Regional State (SNNPRS). 
One-third of Kaffa Zone is covered by montane moist forests. In comparison 
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to other rural areas of Ethiopia, Kaffa Zone is relatively accessible since a na-
tional gravel road cuts through it. However, it is sparsely populated by 
Ethiopian standards, with slightly more than a million inhabitants distrib-
uted over 13,228 km² (75 persons per km²) (Ahrens 1997, Baah et al. 2000: 5). 
The terrain of Kaffa Zone is dominated by a dissected tableland with flat 
to moderately undulating terrain.  It is located 1,500 metres above sea level, 
with a maximum altitude of 3,350 metres (Ersado 2001). The area enjoys 
some of the highest rainfall in Ethiopia, and the temperature never exceeds 
29° Celsius (Mayne & Tola 2002). 
Good accessibility has promoted immigration, and due to a long history 
of population inflow, the ethnic composition of Kaffa Zone is now rather het-
erogeneous. In this paper, however, the focus is on communities of the origi-
nal inhabitants, namely the Kaffa people, including the ethnic group of 
Mandjah,2 who dwell within or adjacent to the forest areas. Their livelihood 
is based on subsistence rain-fed farming and horticulture (with maize and 
enset3 as the major staple foods) and the utilisation of a great many forest 
products. Coffee from forest, semi-forest, and garden production systems4 
and honey are the main cash crops. Plantation production plays a marginal 
role, both socio-economically and ecologically. 
This paper is based on a literature review and on empirical field research 
conducted in Kaffa Zone in 2003/04. Methodologically, a combination of 
techniques including semi-structured interviews, focus group discussions, 
and visual communication techniques such as mental forest mapping and 
timeline mapping was applied. The data obtained were cross-checked and 
triangulated. 
 
 
From prehistoric times to the end of the Ethiopian Empire 
 
In prehistoric times, people in the forested highlands of contemporary Kaffa 
Zone lived predominantly from shifting cultivation. Population density was 
low, agricultural tools and technologies simple, and trade marginal. Small 
quantities of coffee were harvested in forest and semi-forest production sys-
tems and used for home consumption. 
                                            
2  Hartmann (2004: 2-4) compares the status of the Mandjah people among the Kaffa with 
that of the untouchables in India. 
3  A plantain-like perennial crop endemic to Ethiopia. 
4  Forest coffee-use systems can be defined as being ‘managed in a manner that does not alter 
the typical locally specific species composition of the forest. A certain degree of selection is tol-
erable’. Semi-forest coffee-use systems can be defined as ‘forest coffee manipulated through 
thinning of over-story trees, removal of ground vegetation and enrichment of empty spaces by 
transplanting naturally regenerated or raised seedlings’ (Teketay, 1999: 28). 
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The use of the forest resources was defined by governance systems 
based on common property, exclusive rights, or open access. Rights and ac-
cess to the resources were defined by local control systems, largely domi-
nated by the authority of the village elders (Kigenyi et al. 2002: 8). 
The Kingdom of Kaffa was overthrown and occupied in 1897 by the 
Ethiopian Empire after a violent, almost 20-year struggle. In order to ensure 
continuing submission and to meet the requirements of effective occupation, 
the conquerors initiated political and socio-economic transformations in the 
occupied regions. Loyal soldiers of the imperial army – predominantly Am-
hara people from north and central Ethiopia – were rewarded with land 
property rights in the conquered areas, including the forest lands. Accord-
ingly, these settlers were subsumed under the Amharic term neftegna, which 
translates literally as ‘man with a rifle’.5 The neftegna were allowed to sell and 
exchange land titles, but – in contrast to the European concept of a freehold 
system - had no absolute rights as the state could at any time confiscate and 
reallocate land, for example, when a neftegna fell into disgrace with the Em-
peror. This land governance system became known as the gult (Crummey 
2000, EEA / EEPRI 2002, Kebede 2003). 
Together with these land rights, the neftegna gained lordship over groups 
of local peasants – the gebber6 (some literature refers to the gult as the 
neftegna-gebber system). The neftegna ‘obtained’ gebber in numbers according 
to their military rank; the affiliation of a gebber to a neftegna was hereditary 
(Crummey 2000: 223). The landlords administered their rights and belong-
ings not by themselves but through an intermediary district officer, the chi-
quashum, who was usually of Kaffa ethnicity (Taddese Asmellash n.d.: 4). The 
chiquashum sectioned the land and allocated single plots of agricultural and 
forest land to the gebbers, who received usage rights. Gebbers were allowed to 
use and manage the agricultural and forest areas according to their needs 
and facilities. Usage rights were given only for a certain period of time and 
could be easily revoked by the chiquashum. Gebber were required to contrib-
ute a full range of in-kind services and labour, and were threatened with 
eviction from the land or imprisonment if they failed to do so. A peasant 
whose father was a gebber during imperial times recalls the specific regula-
tions: 
 
The chiquashum gave the order to give ten percent of our harvest to him. For 
all crops we had. When we collected coffee from the forest, he got ten per-
cent, also from the honey (Interview 12/11/2004). 
 
                                            
5  The name is still used for the descendents of Amhara people settling in the south of 
Ethiopia. 
6  Gebber (also gebbar) (Amharic) refers to a tribute-paying smallholder peasant. 
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This land governance system obviously went far beyond a voluntary land-
lease agreement and rather resembles the extractive serfdom of the European 
Dark Ages. The neftegna forced the gebber to extract as much economic benefit 
from the forest as possible. The gebber, in turn, had no incentive to use and 
manage the forest in a sustainable way since forest land-use rights were fre-
quently withdrawn without compensation. 
 
 
The state entitlement of the Derg 
 
From 1974 on, the new military government, popularly known as the Derg,7 
proclaimed the abolition of the gult system using the slogan ‘land to the 
tiller’, that is, assignment of land tenure rights to the people who cultivate 
the land. The land reform of 1975 aimed to put this proclamation into prac-
tice and can be depicted as ‘one of the most radical land reform[s] ever at-
tempted in Africa’ (Pausewang 1990), laying the foundation of a land tenure 
system based on the socialist model. All existing land tenure and rights sys-
tems in Ethiopia – including the gult – were abolished, the neftegna were dis-
possessed, and all land holdings, whether farmland, grazing land, or forests, 
were nationalised and came under direct possession of the state. 
Many observers at the time, not only those who were leftists, considered 
the land reform to be a drastic but inevitable breakthrough which would 
effectively put an end to the age-old tenant and landlord system in Ethiopia and 
provide a chance to promote agricultural productivity, social equity, and plan-
ning reliability (EEA/ EEPRI 2002: 23). In 1975, the land reform was finally 
sealed by Proclamation No. 31/1975, and included the following declarations: 
• Public ownership of all rural lands 
• Distribution of private land to the gebber 
• Prohibition of transfer of use rights by sale, exchange, succession, mort-
gage, or lease, except upon death and even then only to the wife, husband, 
or minor children of the deceased 
• The maximum land a family can possess is determined to be ten hectares  
• No capable adult person is allowed to use hired labour to cultivate his 
holdings 
                                            
7  The rise of the Derg is partly attributed to the 1972–73 famine in northern Ethiopia, since 
Emperor Haile Selassis’ governmental apparatus tried to conceal and understate its dimen-
sions and reacted tardily, which ‘exposed the insensitivity of the ruling elites to a lot of ordinary 
citizens’ (Gudina, 2003: 77). In this regard, the Derg regime began with the burden of an eco-
logical catastrophe and growing public awareness of the need for more appropriate natural 
resource management (Marena ET02). 
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Nationwide administration of land governance was vested to a newly estab-
lished Ministry of Land Reform and Administration (MLRA). At the local 
level, the enactment of the ‘Proclamation to Provide for the Nationalization 
of Rural Land No. 71/1975’ led to the formation of agricultural producers 
cooperatives, agricultural service cooperatives, and peasant associations. 
Peasant associations were designated as the lowest administrative bodies of 
the state, within which a number of village communities were grouped to-
gether. They were given full control over redistribution of land and man-
agement of natural resources, and from 1975 on they started to give usufruct 
land rights to individual peasants and to agricultural producers coopera-
tives. The condition for obtaining land-use rights was the peasants’ perma-
nent physical residence in the peasant association and their capability and 
willingness to farm themselves and to fulfil administrative dues and obliga-
tions (EEA/EEPRI 2002: 23, Pankhurst 2002: 11). 
Simultaneously with the transformation of land governance, the govern-
ance of forest resources was transformed into a state matter. The neftegna and 
chiquashum lost their titles. Accordingly, the gebber lost their usage rights to 
the forest plots which they had been using and managing up to that time. 
The peasant associations received full responsibility for governing the forest 
areas, according to local demands and state laws. The role that peasant asso-
ciations played in practice with regard to the governance of forests in Kaffa 
Zone, however, was fuzzy and inconstant. Zewdie (2003: 21) has emphasised 
that the involvement of peasant associations in forest governance in Kaffa 
Zone varied considerably from one association to another. Some officially 
distributed forest-use rights among their members, some just informally, and 
others not at all. The forest-related undertakings of the peasant associations 
were not long-term –oriented, nor were they backed by systematic govern-
mental directives. By and large, peasant associations did not effectually gov-
ern the forests in their area of jurisdiction according to their mandate. 
 
 
Transformation of local forest governance under the Derg  
 
In practice, the local-level forest governance that had been exercised during 
the gult system persisted after the revolution to a limited extent. Many peas-
ants, although they were now members in peasant associations, continued to 
utilise and manage the forest plots for which they had received usage rights 
from the chiquashum. This is illustrated in the following short narrative of a 
peasant: 
 
The Derg gave land to all people that they could live equally. The Derg gave 
some land to me. I got six hectares of farm land only, but there was no re-
form on forest land (Interview 12/11/2004). 
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This statement gives an impression of how the Derg’s land reform was actu-
ally experienced at the local level and that it ‘arrived’ there only in parts. 
Consequently, from the mid-1970s onwards, traditional and newly initiated 
forest property-rights systems from the state created a de facto situation of 
legal pluralism at the local level. The former gebber tried to execute their for-
est resource use and management activities on the basis of the former distri-
bution of usage rights rather than within the scope of the then formal institu-
tions. The new state bodies reacted erratically. Indeed, the traditional forest 
use rights were illegitimate due to the new state laws, and in a few cases 
state bodies actually enforced their power, through actions such as the invol-
untary relocation, fining, or imprisonment of forest users. By and large, how-
ever, the state bodies tolerated the situation as they had little means and / or 
motivation to actively change the status quo. One has to recall that the indi-
viduals that were now working in the peasant associations were mostly for-
mer gebber who had kinship and peer relationships on site and also contin-
ued to informally own ‘their’ forest plots. One state official explained the 
situation as follows: 
Even if the land officially belonged to the state, it unofficially belonged to 
the people. The peasant association knew and accepted it. But forest owners 
were not supported by the peasant association (Interview 24/11/2004). 
This arrangement was consolidated over time, in that the peasants trans-
ferred their rights within kinship networks, mainly through patrilinear in-
heritance to their sons. There is no evidence that the forest property rights in 
the research area have been subject to disposal. 
When a father divides his forest, the first son gets the most; the second and 
third, etc., less. The boys who are engaged in school or in governmental 
jobs often get no forest (Interview 5/11/2004). 
On the one hand, the transmission of forest land rights from one generation 
to another implicates not only an emotional relatedness and the binding of 
the forest owners with ‘their’ forest plot but also a commitment to sustain-
ability that was likely to guide their decisions and activities. On the other 
hand, however, post-revolutionary local forest governance was weak 
because it lacked explicit enforcement. Theory says that the pure existence of 
institutions does not inevitably impact on human behaviour per se. To guar-
antee effectiveness, institutions need to be complemented by harmonising 
implementation and enforcement instruments which foresee consequences in 
the event of contravention and thereby limit deviant behaviour (Agrawal & 
Yadama 1997, Brett 1995, Ostrom et al. 1994). Before the revolution in 1974, 
the traditional forest property rights were based upon institutional arrange-
ments enforced by bodies of the feudal system, notably the neftegna and chi-
quashum. After the revolution, the forest owners continued to own their 
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rights to forest land but with little chance to implement and enforce them. 
Two statements of local peasants illustrate the situation: 
Even if there was forest ownership during the Derg, anybody could go into 
the forest and steal what he liked. The forest is vast and uncontrollable (In-
terview 24/11/2004). 
Nothing happened to us when the Derg came. Nothing was forbidden 
(26/11/2204). 
The peasant associations did not prosecute people who took ‘what they liked 
to’ form the forest, thus leading to a situation where ‘nothing was forbidden’. 
Thus, despite the existence of legal pluralism at the local level, the situation  
was reminiscent of a classical open-access situation with no or limited incen-
tives for the sustainable use and management of forest resources. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
In this paper, two periods of forest governance in Kaffa Zone have been ana-
lysed in view of their impact on forest depletion and the loss that has been 
simultaneously experienced in the area. The Derg revolution in 1974 entailed 
a rapid and fundamental transformation from feudal land-lease agreements 
that resembled the extractive serfdom of the European Dark Ages to social-
ist-inspired nationalisation of all land holdings, including forests. Upon 
closer examination, however, it is evident that the radical land reform under 
the slogan ‘land to the tiller’ did not dissolve all land tenure rights from the 
feudal past. Rather, it gave rise to an overexpansion of state control com-
bined with no or only uncoordinated and incoherent implementation of ex-
isting forest tenure policies. It seems that the Derg government underestimated 
– and hence neglected – the path dependency of local-level forest governance 
schemes. Forest governance patterns that were formalised before the revolu-
tion continued to exist de facto with an informal status afterwards. 
However, it also becomes apparent in the case study that the existence of 
institutions, both formal and informal, does not guarantee their effectiveness. 
One the one hand, post-revolutionary local forest governance was character-
ised by legal pluralism. On the other, it lacked explicit enforcement. Pre-
revolutionary enforcement mechanisms were either dissolved or weakened 
due to their illegality, post-revolutionary ones were established in a top-down 
manner and often did not actually ‘reach’ the remote forest areas. Accordingly, 
both structures were not able to bring ‘their’ institutions into effect. 
But what can be concluded when we reminisce about the rapid depletion 
and loss of the montane moist forests which was occurring steadily  over the 
same period of time? The paper shows that at no moment in the reviewed 
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timeframe did local forest users have contractually warranted and effectively 
enforceable usage rights for their forests. The neftegna-gebber system put 
peasants under constant threat of being evicted from the forest land. The 
takeover by the Derg resulted in legal pluralism; however, this was without 
explicit enforcement mechanisms, either from the state or from traditional 
organisational entities. Accordingly, both situations provided forest users 
with limited means and incentives for sustainable forest use and manage-
ment activities and hence promoted the depletion and loss of the Ethiopian 
montane moist forests. 
What lessons can be extended to the present situation? Many of the is-
sues discussed in this historical review are still high on the agenda in Ethio-
pia, and the political shortcomings have to some degree been retained and 
repeated by the new ruling elites since the regime change in 1991. Indeed, the 
basics have not changed much. The Ethiopian forests are still rapidly declin-
ing and forest land is still nationalised as ‘a common property of the Nations, 
Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia [that] shall not be subject to sale or to 
other means of exchange’ (Art. 40, Ethiopian Constitution 1995). In reality, 
though, the Ethiopian forests are governed through an overlapping mosaic of 
institutions initiated by the state, communities, NGOs, or private investors, 
under different levels of enforcement. The overall majority of forest users 
continue to have no contractually warranted and effectively enforceable us-
age rights for ‘their’ forests.8 
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